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Abstract  
The paper argues that micro and macro economists interested in the dynamics of creative 
destruction can gain important insights by using indices that capture the effect of 
innovation on the relative position of firms.  This is due to the uneven and “destructive” 
effect that radical innovation has on firm rankings. One such index is the market share 
instability index.  On the financial side, the excess volatility of stock prices and 
idiosyncratic risk also appear to capture the uneven dynamics of creative destruction.  The 
paper concludes by considering the implications of these propositions for economy-wide 
growth during periods of radical innovation (e.g. GPTs).  
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Introduction  
Entry and exit patterns in the microeconomics and industrial organization (IO) 
literature, and firm turnover rates in the macroeconomics literature, are often used to 
describe and measure industrial turbulence during periods of Schumpetarian creative 
destruction.  Macro studies on the effect of innovation on the reallocation of resources 
within and between sectors use such data to study the turbulence underlying this 
reallocation (Caballero and Hammour 2000, Davis and Haltiwanger 1998).  IO studies 
analyze the relationship between innovation and entry/exit patterns to gain insights on 
the cause and consequences of the industry “shakeout” common to the early evolution 
of many industries (Geroski and Mazzucato 2001, Gort and Klepper 1982, Klepper 1996, 
Utterback and Suarez 1993).  And the organizational ecology literature, which lies at the 
intersection between strategic management and IO, studies the relationship between 
entry/exit rates (which they use to calculate “firm density”) and the dynamic process by 
which firms gain “legitimation” (Carroll and Hannan 2000).    
 
Yet if one is interested in the turbulence that emerges from the destruction side of 
creative destruction, it is not necessarily entry and exit data, or firm turnover rates, that 
one should focus on.  It is (just as) important to look at measures that capture changes in 
the relative position of firms, i.e. measures that capture the essence of the competitive 
battle between firms.  Schumpeter described this battle as a  “…process of industrial 
mutation…that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” (Schumpeter 1975: p. 83).  
Such relative measures include, the rank turnover index (Gort 1963) and the market 
share instability index (Hymer and Pashigian 1962).    
 
For example, in the personal computer industry, although entry rates were 
highest during the 1980’s, market shares during this period were relatively stable as was 
also the concentration ratio up until the early 1990’s.  It was only when “competence 
destroying” innovations, such as the rise of Wintel and the World Wide Web in the 
1990’s, destroyed IBM’s monopoly of the innovation process that market shares (and 
market structure) became unstable. This is the period of creative destruction in the 
industry (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997). 
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Due to their focus on the emergence and evolution of inter-firm variety, 
evolutionary economists have long emphasized the importance of focusing on relative 
change rather than absolute change.  For this reason evolutionary models often use 
replicator dynamics, or distance from mean dynamics, to describe growth processes 
rather than models that rely on the representative agent (Metcalfe 1994, Mazzucato 
2000).  In an evolutionary context where growth is a function of how agents differ from 
the mean, a world of representative agents—no matter how optimal, would be a world 
without growth.   The focus on relative change is also found in “population” based 
models of organizational ecology.   
 
Yet there are not many empirical applications of these approaches which focus 
on indices of competition which capture the relative changes between firms.  Many 
continue to rely on standard indices in industrial organization, such as changes in 
concentration, or proxies of turbulence like entry/exit rates and turnover rates.  Using a 
limited set of empirical examples, our paper concentrates on the ability of some 
alternative indices, from both the IO literature and the finance literature, to capture 
creative destruction, or what the strategic management literature calls “competence 
destroying innovations” i.e. innovations that undermine the advantage of incumbents 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990). Our main point is that these 
indices are particularly useful for researchers that want to isolate those periods of 
industry evolution that undergo the most turbulence due to the dynamics of creative 
destruction.  
 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section I uses examples from the personal 
computer and automobile industry to prove that the turbulence caused by radical 
innovation is not (always) well captured by entry and exit data.  Section II shows how 
market share instability captures such periods of competence-destroying innovations at 
the core of Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction.  Section III proposes that IO 
economists interested in such instability can gain important insights by evaluating 
indicators of stock price volatility since these indicators also appear to capture (indirectly) 
the effects of creative destruction. Section IV emphasizes the aggregation problems that 
arise when industry level indicators of turbulence are not derived using firm level data.  
Section V explores some possible implications of these points for our understanding of 
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growth led by general purpose technologies (GPTs).  Section VI summarizes the main 
points in the paper.  
 
An important note: the points made in Sections I-IV arise from previous empirical 
work on the computer industry and the automobile industry (Mazzucato 2002; 2003) as 
well as an analysis of volatility in 34 different industries (Mazzucato and Tancioni 2004).  
Our aim here is to draw out new insights, important to both micro and macroeconomists, 
which these specific examples suggest.  We are in the process of investigating whether 
the points can be made more generally—theoretically through a model of learning under 
different knowledge regimes, and empirically through a study of a larger number of firms 
and industries. Data sources are listed in the Appendix. ` 
 
I. Periods of high entry/exit do not always coincide with periods of radical 
innovation. 
Entry and exit patterns in both the automobile industry and the PC industry follow 
the standard pattern highlighted by industry life-cycle studies (Jovanovic and MacDonald 
1994; Klepper 1996, Utterback and Suarez 1993).  Figure 11 illustrates that in both 
industries, firm numbers rose very quickly during the first two decades—reaching just 
under 300 after 15 years, and then began to steadily fall.  By 1926 only 33% of the firms 
that began producing automobiles during the previous 22 years had survived. By 1999 
only 20% of the firms that began producing PCs in the previous 22 years had survived.    
 
Faithful to the standard life-cycle story, in both industries the shakeout began 
shortly after product standardization2.  In the auto industry the timing of the shakeout 
coincided with Ford’s introduction in 1910 of the industry’s first branch assembly plant to 
                                                          
1 In Figures 1 and 3 “industry age” on the horizontal axis begins with the year that the industry began.  The 
US auto industry began in 1899 and by 1926 it had already attained an equal importance to shipbuilding and 
railroads (Epstein 1928).  The PC industry began in 1974 with the introduction of the first mass produced 
minicomputer, the Altair 8800, produced by Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry Systems (the IBM PC 
emerged later in 1981).    
 
2 Although there are some differences between the different life-cycle approaches (see Klepper and Simons 
1997 for a review), they all emphasize that the shakeout begins with the emergence of a standardized 
product.  One of the main differences between these approaches is the emphasis in Klepper 1996 on 
increasing returns to R&D that occurs simultaneously with product standardization, a more continuous 
process than the emphasis in Utterback and Suarez (1993) on a single discontinuous event. 
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produce the first standardized car, the Model T3.  In the PC industry most of the exits 
occurred between 1987-1993, coinciding with two developments which allowed the 
production of PCs to be standardized and “commoditized”: Intel’s introduction of the 32-
bit 386 processor in 1985 and Microsoft’s introduction of Windows 3.0 in 1990—both of 
which made consumers care more about what was inside the box than who was the 
maker of the box (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997).  
 
Yet the study of innovation dynamics in the two industries reveals that the 
similarities in entry and exit patterns hide an important qualitative difference between the 
two industries: whereas the period of high entry rates in the auto industry was also the 
period of radical technological change, this is not the case in the PC industry.  Empirical 
studies on technological change in the auto industry suggest that the most radical 
innovations occurred in the very early years, when entry rates were the highest (i.e. 
before 1925).  Abernathy et al. (1986) list all process and product innovations in the auto 
industry from 1893-1981, weighting them— via a “transilience” scale— 1 to 7 according 
to how much they affected the production process: 7s represent radical innovations (e.g. 
the advent of the assembly line in 1910) and 1s incremental ones (e.g. new paint 
procedure).  During these 88 years, there were only 18 innovations that received a 6 or 
7, and nine of these occurred before 1917.  After 1940, only four innovations received 
such high weights.  Figure 2, which displays the innovation index over time (the number 
of product and process innovations multiplied by their weights), illustrates that the 
intensity of innovation fell over time.  Filson’s (2001) “quality change index” (a proxy for 
technological change, derived by dividing actual prices by hedonic prices) confirm these 
dynamics.  
 
Unlike the auto industry where most of the price and quality changes occurred in 
the first decade, most of the price and quality changes in the PC industry occurred in the 
third decade of its evolution: 34% quality change between 1975-1986, 17% between 
1987-1992 and 38% in the period 1993-1999 (Filson 2001).  This third decade includes 
the rise of the Intel chip (1987), the rise of Windows (1990), and the commercial rise of 
                                                          
3 The extraordinarily high exit rate in 1910 was due to the large fall in demand for high-priced cars that 
occurred in that year and the fact that those firms not able to adapt to the new standardized cheaper cars 
(lighter-weight, four cylinder vehicles) were forced to exit (Epstein 1928).   
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the World Wide Web (1995)—all contributing to the loss of IBM’s monopolistic control of 
sales and the innovation process4.   
 
¾ Main point: The case of the personal computer industry suggests that periods of 
competence destroying innovations, at the heart of Schumpeter’s notion of creative 
destruction, are not always captured by entry and exit data.  What is (also) needed is 
an index that captures changes in the relative positions of firms.  The next two 
sections propose the use of such indices from the IO literature and the finance 
literature. 
 
II. Market share instability captures creative destruction. 
As argued above, in both the automobile and PC industries, periods in which 
innovation was most radical were also the periods in which market shares underwent the 
greatest change.  This supports the literature on “competence-destroying” innovations 
which emphasizes the effect of radical (or architectural) innovations in upsetting industry 
structure (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Henderson and Clark 1990).  It also supports 
the focus of evolutionary economics on the relative growth, as opposed to the absolute 
growth, of firms (Dosi and Nelson 1994).  The market share instability index, devised by 
Hymer and Pashigian (1962) is particularly appropriate for capturing this type of change 
(for further discussion, see Mazzucato 2000):   
|][| 1,
1
−
=
−= ∑ tin
i
it ssI      (1) 
  
where  its = the market share of firm i at time t.  The higher is I, the more competitive is 
the industry5.   
                                                          
4 Bresnahan and Greenstein (1997) attribute the higher degree of competitive innovation in this third decade 
of the PC industry to the “vertically disintegrated” structure of innovation—spread out between the makers of 
the PCs (e.g. Dell), the makers of microprocessors (e.g. Intel), the makers of the operating systems (e.g. 
Microsoft), and the makers of application software (e.g. Lotus).  From 1980-1988, innovation in the PC 
industry was more of the “competence-enhancing” type: it served to enhance the existing competencies and 
lead of IBM.  From 1989-1996, innovation in the PC industry was of the “competence-destroying” type: new 
radical innovations destroyed the lead of IBM.    
 
5 Although the index might be affected by the number of firms, it is empirically not very sensitive to it 
because small firms do not contribute greatly to the value of the index.  This is because they account for 
such a small share of the industry and because they tend to grow no faster on average than large firms 
(Hymer and Pashigian 1962, p. 86).  To prevent the changing number of firms to affect this index, I is 
calculated here using only the market shares of the top 10 firms in each industry. In the auto industry, the 10 
firms are: Ford, GM, Chrysler, Studebaker, Packard, Hudson, Nash, Willys, Kaiser and American Motors.    
 6
The market share instability index has been deemed, in various studies, to be a 
more dynamic index of competition than the concentration ratio (Gort 1963, Mazzucato 
2000).  Even if the concentration ratio is very high, if the instability index is also high 
(due, for example, to the constant change in identity of the top 4 firms), the industry can 
be considered competitive.  A similar index is the rank order index, which tracks changes 
in rankings between firms.   
 
Using the instability index, Table 1 and Figure 3 indicate that in the auto industry 
market share instability was highest during the period 1900-1928.  This is supported by 
Figure 4, which illustrates the constantly changing positions of the 28 leading producers 
during this period (Epstein 1928).  From 1940 onwards, market share instability steadily 
decreased as did also innovation and new firm entry.  Market share instability 
temporarily increased in the 1970s, when foreign firms entered the US auto market, but 
the level was still much lower than that experienced during the industry’s early creative 
stage.   
 
In the PC industry, market share instability rose with the entry of new firms in the 
1980’s but became especially high in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when IBM lost its 
monopoly of the innovation process (until then all innovations had to be “IBM 
compatible”).  The new innovations allowed the firms—that had entered earlier—to gain 
market share and have greater influence over the innovation process.  Table 1 indicates 
that market share instability in the PC industry was highest in the decade 1990-2000.  
Column 2 in Table 1 indicates that this was not the same period in which absolute firm 
growth was the highest: individual firms and the industry as a whole grew fastest during 
the decades in which entry rates were highest (1974-1984), but the greatest changes in 
market shares occurred during the decades with the most radical innovations 
(Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997).   
 
¾ Main point: Measures/indices of competition used in dynamic IO, such as the market 
share instability index, are useful for capturing the turbulence caused by radical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
In the PC industry, the 10 firms are: IBM, NCR, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, Dell, Gateway, Toshiba, 
Wang, and Unisys.  In the PC industry, different compositions of top firms were experimented with to ensure 
that I is not sensitive to the particular firms included in the calculation. 
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innovation. Such indices are, in our opinion, at times more useful than entry/exit data 
(or turnover rates) to capture the “destructive” side of creative destruction.  
 
In the next section we consider how measures/indices of stock price volatility are also 
useful for capturing such turbulence.  
  
III. Stock price volatility appears to capture creative destruction. 
When investors value a firm they are comparing the potential future growth of the 
firm to that of its competitors.  What they care most about is not the absolute health of 
the firm, but whether it will win against its competitors.  Hence when a firm’s stock price 
goes up, this movement is often associated with the fall in another firm’s price (e.g. as 
was witnessed with the rise of the dot.com firms).  And as innovation is a key factor in a 
firm’s future growth, we expect that movements in stock prices will be associated with 
changes in innovation.   
 
The relationship between innovation and stock market values operates through 
the effect of the news on innovation on the expected future cash flows of the firm.  As 
indicated in Pakes (1985), the effect of new patents on stock market rates of return 
operates as follows:  
“…changes in the stock market value of the firm should reflect (possibly with error) 
changes in the expected discounted present value of the firm’s entire uncertain net cash 
flow stream. Thus, if an event [a successful patent application] does occur that causes 
the market to reevaluate the accumulated output of the firm’s research laboratories, its 
full effect on stock market values ought to be recorded immediately.” (Pakes, 1985: p. 
392).    
 
Literature on this topic includes Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) which links 
stock prices to innovation in a model in which innovation causes new capital to destroy 
old capital (with a lag). Since it is primarily incumbents who are initially quoted on the 
stock market, innovations cause the stock market to decline immediately since rational 
investors with perfect foresight foresee the future damage to old capital. They claim that 
this explains why the computer stock fell relative to the S&P500 in the 1980’s: because 
the computer firms that were quoted on the market at that time were the incumbents 
whose capabilities and competencies would be made obsolete by the radical innovations 
in the 1990’s.   
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Yet both Pakes (1985) and Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) focus mainly on 
(changes in) the level of stock prices not on volatility.  Why should stock price volatility 
be related to creative destruction? In general, when radical innovations upset the 
existing market structure, this affects the market valuation process due to the effect of 
uncertainty (e.g. market share instability) on the ability of investors to predict future 
rankings.  In a study of the auto industry (1898-1998), Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) 
find a correlation between market share instability and the excess volatility of stock 
prices, i.e. the degree to which stock prices are more volatile than the present value of 
discounted future dividends.  In a comparative study of autos and personal computers, 
Mazzucato (2002) finds that both the “excess volatility” of stock prices and “idiosyncratic 
risk”, i.e. the degree to which firm level stock returns are more volatile than market level 
stock returns (S&P 500), were highest precisely during the decades in which innovation 
was the most radical and “competence-destroying”. 
 
Below, we first explain how excess volatility was calculated in Mazzucato (2002), 
and then connect the empirical results attained to the core points in this paper.  Excess 
volatility compares the volatility of actual stock prices with those that would be predicted 
by the efficient market model (Shiller 1981).  The efficient market model (EMM) states 
that the real stock price is equal to the expected value of discounted future dividends: 
  *ttt vEv =            (2) 
∏∑
=
+
∞
=
+=
k
j
jt
k
ktt Dv
00
* γ          (3) 
where *tv is the ex-post rational or perfect-foresight price, ktD + is the dividend stream, 
jt+γ is a real discount factor equal to )1/(1 jtr ++ , and jtr + is the short (one-period) rate of 
discount at time t+j.   
 
To calculate excess volatility for the auto and computer industry, the perfect 
foresight price *tv  is computed using the industry level stock price and dividend data.  
After dividing the industry level data by the S&P 500 equivalent (e.g. average automobile 
dividend / S&P 500 dividend), and detrending the data to ensure stationarity, *tv  is 
calculated recursively using Equation (4): 
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for which the moving average version is: 
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where ATv is the actual price at the terminal date T (the subscripts for firm i and industry j 
are not included).  Given the lag in Eq. (4), it is not possible to calculate *tv  at T.  
Instead, if T=100, the value for *tv at t = 99 is calculated by using tv at T in place of 
1+tv in Eq. (4). Then for each other value from t = 1 to t = 98, Eq. (4) is used.    
 
The results on excess volatility in computers and autos are illustrated in Figures 5 
and 6.  The key point is that in both cases the difference between the standard deviation 
of efficient market prices (vt*), (prices that reflect the present value of future dividends) 
and actual stock prices (vt) is highest during the periods that innovation was most radical 
(Abernathy et al. 1983, Filson 2001, Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997).  As discussed 
above, these are precisely the periods when market shares were most unstable, i.e. 
when competence destroying innovations upset the ranking between firms.  This 
suggests that the “excess volatility of stock prices”, like “market share instability”, is 
useful for (indirectly) capturing changes in relative growth of firms.  
 
Another measure of stock price volatility which captures the effect of creative 
destruction on the relative growth of firms is “idiosyncratic risk”.  Idiosyncratic risk is 
measures the degree to which firm-specific (or industry-specific) returns are more 
volatile than general market returns (Campbell et al. 2000).  The stock return of firm i at 
time t is defined as:  
 
(6) 
 
where Pit is the stock price of firm i at time t, Dit is the dividend of firm i at time t.  
Idiosyncratic risk is calculated by dividing the standard deviation (denoted in brackets) of 
firm i’s stock return by the standard deviation of the stock return of the general market M 
(the average for the S&P 500 firms):  
1
1,
,,
, −+=
−ti
titi
ti P
DP
r
 10
 
(7) 
 
 
Using cointegration analysis between firm specific stock returns and market 
returns, Mazzucato (2002) finds that idiosyncratic risk in both industries under 
invetigation, like excess volatility, was highest during the periods of radical innovation.   
 
The fact that both market share instability and stock price volatility are correlated 
with periods of radical innovation, suggest that both types of turbulence are related to 
real production factors.  This is important since in both the industrial organization 
literature and the finance literature, volatility is often discussed in terms of “random” 
and/or transient factors (Evans 1987; Shiller 1981).  An understanding of how patterns of 
innovation in both industries are related to different types of turbulence and volatility 
provides an alternative, innovation-based, understanding of volatility and idiosyncratic 
risk.    
 
¾ Main point: Here we have suggested that indices of excess volatility and idiosyncratic 
risk, like the market share instability index discussed above, are highest during 
periods of radical innovation and are thus relevant to the analysis and measurement 
of creative destruction. Like market share instability, they are helpful for capturing 
changes in the relative growth of firms. 
 
IV. Aggregate industry data hides the dynamics of creative destruction. 
In this section we consider whether the results in Section III can be generalized across 
different industries.  That is, given the finding that periods of radical innovation exhibit 
high excess volatility of stock prices and idiosyncratic risk, we test whether industries 
which are deemed to be highly innovative exhibit more volatility of stock prices than 
those that are deemed to be less innovative.   Idiosyncratic risk is studied at the industry 
level so that in Eq. 7 above firm i is replaced with industry j (i.e. the volatility of the stock 
returns of industry j are compared with the volatility of the stock returns of the general 
market).  Thirty four industries are studied: Table 2 includes the list of these industries 
along with their descriptive statistics. Using R&D intensity data (R&D spending/total 
sales for each industry), the industries are first divided into the following three 
tM
ti
ti r
r
IR
,
,
, =
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categories: “very innovative”, “innovative” and “low innovative”. The categorization 
supports that found in Marsili (2001), which builds on Pavitt’s (1984) sectoral taxonomy 
of innovation. 
 
To study whether idiosyncratic risk is higher in innovative industries than in less 
innovative industries, we use different statistical and econometric tools: basic descriptive 
statistics; deterministic and stochastic trend analysis of volatility (Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests for unit roots); Granger causality analysis to see whether the general market 
returns have predictive capabilities for the innovative industries (i.e. we expect the 
general market returns to have no predictive capabilities for the innovative industries’ 
stock returns); variance decomposition analysis to study the relative contributions of unit-
specific and unspecific variances to the single units volatilities; and regression analysis 
with the CAPM model to evaluate the degree to which the average market return 
explains the industry level returns.  In each case the null hypothesis is that there is no 
relation between innovation and idiosyncratic risk (both measured at the industry level).  
Detailed results can be found in the working paper by Mazzucato and Tancioni (2004).   
 
The main result is that, at the industry level, no coherent pattern emerges 
between innovation and idiosyncratic risk.  While some of the innovative industries 
conform to the predicted behavior (more idiosyncratic risk), other innovative ones 
do not.  The same holds for the low innovative industries.  In fact, our expectations 
seem to be only fulfilled in the extremes of the categorization (e.g. semiconductors 
on the innovative side).  These results suggest that calculating volatility with 
aggregate industry level data (average stock prices and dividends for the industry 
as a whole) does not permit us to capture volatility behavior that is specific to 
innovative industries.    
In a preliminary analysis of firm level data, Mazzucato and Tancioni (2004) 
try to get beyond the aggregation problems by looking at firm level dynamics for a 
select group of 34 firms in five different industries which have very different levels 
of innovativeness: computers, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and textiles6.  The 
                                                          
6 The reason that data for only 34 firms was studied is that to conduct the firm level panel analysis we had to 
use a select group of firms that were available for the entire time period, 1974-2002. We recognize that this 
is very limiting and while it serves our preliminary explorative purpose, we intend to look at a much greater 
number of firms in the future.  
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firms (about 7 for each industry) were chosen to represent a balanced group of 
large and small firms in each industry.  We take annual firm-level R&D intensity 
data and see whether at the firm level this variable can explain observed changes 
in firm level volatility of stock returns.  Panel estimation procedures are used to test 
for the relationship between the volatility of stock returns and R&D intensity 
(R&D/sales)7.  Employing monthly observations on stock returns, the annual 
volatility figures are calculated as 12 term (monthly returns) standard deviations. 
Given the small time dimension of the sample obtained, the preferred estimators 
are the pooled OLS and GLS, both with the common constant (C) and Fixed 
Effects (FE) versions. In order to control for the effects of dimensionality on 
volatility, the firms’ relative capitalization weights are also entered in the different 
specifications. The idiosyncratic elements can thus be captured by the GLS 
weighting, the FE specification and the relative weights in capitalization. The best 
results are obtained when the R&D intensity measure is entered with 5-year lags.  
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis under different specifications.  The 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between volatility and R&D intensity is not 
rejected by the data. The innovation effect is statistically meaningful8.  These 
results are encouraging and suggest that a more direct consideration of innovation 
activity, for example using patent data, may improve the results (this is the focus of 
our work in progress).   
¾ Main point: In this section we have asked whether some of the results concerning 
innovation and stock price volatility discussed in Section III can be generalized 
across different industries (thirty four industries with different levels of 
innovativeness).  Preliminary analysis suggests that the relationship between 
                                                          
7 R&D intensity is of course an imperfect proxy for innovation since it is only the input to innovation.  Patent 
data is a better proxy for innovative output.  However, we leave this to our work in progress where we 
connect NBER patent citations data with industrial and financial volatility data (Mazzucato and Tancioni 
2005). 
 
8 It is interesting to note that the relationship tends to be weakened by considering different firm-specific 
factors. In particular, jointly controlling for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity via GLS and for Fixed Effects 
makes the R&D intensity coefficient statistically meaningless. This potentially happens because the 
covariation between R&D intensity and volatility may be captured by the two sectional corrections (FE and 
GLS). The same occurs to the coefficient on the weight for capitalization, resulting statistically meaningless 
only when entered in a FE-GLS specification. The possibility that the joint consideration of both the 
corrections for the sectional specificities is responsible for this result is also signaled by the fact that the 
percentage of variance explained by the regression does not improve when moving from a FE OLS to a FE 
GLS, while the GLS correction resulted highly effective when the a common constant restriction was 
imposed. 
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innovation and volatility, discussed in Section III, does not appear when aggregate 
industry data is used to calculate volatility (e.g. average stock prices and average 
dividends). This should act as a warning for researchers looking at creative 
destruction with aggregate industry level data (this of course does not apply to 
industry level indices that are calculated using firm level data as in Sections I-III 
above).  In fact, when firm level data is used, a relationship between R&D intensity 
and volatility is found.  These results are being explored further in current work using 
patent citation data.  
V.  Possible implications for growth theory. 
This section explores some possible implications of the results found in Sections I to 
IV for our understanding of the causes and consequences of economic growth during 
periods of radical technological change.  The discussion is intended as exploratory, 
making a new link between the macro literature on growth and the IO literature on 
innovation and market structure.  
 
Recent growth literature has linked TFP growth to the advent of General Purpose 
Technologies or GPTs (Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998).  Some of this literature has 
focused on the effect that such large innovations have on sectoral, cyclical and aggregate 
volatility (e.g. Caballero and Hammour 2000, Imbs 2002).   The underlying assumption in 
this work is that radical innovations (often introduced by new firms) lead to increases in 
firm-level productivity and growth and the summation of the growth of individual firms 
leads to increases in industry growth (and productivity)9.  Since innovation causes intra 
and inter sectoral reallocation, this also leads to greater volatility in growth rates10.  When 
these innovations are GPTs this can lead to economy wide growth and volatility, such as 
that experienced during the New Economy years (late 1990’s) which were driven by the IT 
revolution (David and Wright 1999, Gordon 2000).  Aggregate volatility, in this framework, 
arises from the economy re-adjusting itself to the new technological paradigm.  In general, 
the macro literature on Schumpetarian waves and growth predicts a positive correlation 
                                                          
9 For example, Imbs (2002) states: “A direct implication is that the link between sectoral volatility and growth 
should vary systematically with the sectoral rate of (total factor) productivity. In particular, the higher 
productivity growth, the higher the positive correlation between growth and volatility”.    
 
10 Caballero and Hammour (2000) argue that productivity growth arises from factors shifting from low to high 
productivity areas.  They also show that most of the increase in productivity occurs from reallocation occurs 
within not between sectors.    
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between the growth of firms and industries introducing the new technologies, the 
productivity and volatility of these industries, and the growth, productivity and volatility of 
the aggregate economy. 
 
The data and arguments provided in Sections I to IV above suggest that the above 
logic may contain some erroneous assumptions.  In some situations, such as the PC story 
describd above, the causation is not from changes in absolute firm growth to industry and 
economy wide growth but instead from changes in relative firm growth to industry volatility 
to aggregate economic growth.  The difference is important since it means that we might 
not be able to associate periods of aggregate economic growth with periods of individual 
firm growth.  What we might instead observe is a relationship between changes in the 
relative growth rates of firms (e.g. measured directly or also indirectly via the market share 
instability index, or in a theoretical model via replicator dynamics), increases in industry 
level productivity and increases in aggregate economic growth.   
 
The connection with economic growth occurs of course only if the industries under 
question are fundamental to economic growth, e.g. industries embodying a new GPT.  
Given that autos and personal computers were the industries that most embodied the 
GPTs of the 1920’s and 1990’s (the proliferation of the internal combustion engine in the 
1920s and the combined advances in the microchip and internet technology in the late 
1980’s/early 1990’s) we can use the early history of these industries to test this tentative 
proposition about growth.  The results are found in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 compares the dynamics of autos and PCs (innovation, market share 
instability, output growth and multi-factor productivity growth-MFP) to that of the general 
economy (MFP growth and GDP growth).  As predicted in the discussion above, the 
period in which the PC industry’s MFP growth was highest was not the same as that when 
firm and industry growth rates were highest (detailed firm level absolute and relative 
growth data can be found in Mazzucato 2003).  Firm and industry growth rates were 
highest when entry rates were highest, i.e. during the first 10 years of the industry when 
production grew the most.  Instead, productivity grew the most when market shares were 
the most unstable, in the 1990’s, the decade of creative destruction.  This was the same 
period that aggregate economy MFP and GDP growth was highest (the New Economy 
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period led by IT).  It is this fact that provides the most support to our exploratory 
proposition about growth.  
 
The economy’s GDP growth was highest precisely during the decades in which 
quality change and market share instability in both industries was highest.  For the years 
for which industry level MFP data is available (only the early evolution of computers), we 
see that this was also the period when both industry and economy wide MFP growth was 
highest.  If we calculate simple productivity figures for autos (output over labor input) we 
get a similar result.  Although GDP growth was marginally higher in the period 1923-1929, 
it is surprising that it was nearly as high in that first decade prior to the mass-production 
revolution of the 1920’s.   
 
The results provide some preliminary insights regarding the relationship between 
firm, sectoral and economy wide growth during Schumpetarian waves.  Of course general 
conclusions cannot be drawn from the study of only two industries.  It is important to test 
these hypotheses on as many different GPT driven industries as possible (our work in 
progress is dedicated to biotechnology and pharmaceuticals).  Nevertheless, the detailed 
history of these two particular industries (as well as the more extensive, albeit less 
qualitative, analysis of the cross section of industries in Section IV), has highlighted the 
importance of understanding the relationship between innovation, inter-firm variety and 
volatility in both micro and macro investigations of growth.  
 
¾ Main point: When creative destruction occurs through competence destroying 
innovations, we should expect to see a correlation between economy wide growth 
and market share instability. Since this does not always occur in the period of high 
entry and output growth (as argued in Section I), it is possible that the common 
assumption that economy wide growth occurs bottom up from firm and industry  
growth is misplaced. Due to the uneven nature of technological change, what 
matters is relative change (and the associated instability) not absolute change.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The paper has explored different propositions which suggest that micro and macro 
economists interested in the dynamics of creative destruction can benefit from paying 
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attention to indicators of turbulence that highlight changes in the relative position of firms, 
a dynamic not well captured by entry and exit data.   It was proposed that some more 
appropriate indicators of the effect of creative destruction on market structures include the 
market share instability index (Hymer and Pashigian 1962) due to its ability to capture 
changes in relative growth rates at the core the creative destruction dynamic.  In fact, in 
both the case of autos and computers, this index was very high during periods of radical 
innovation.  In the case of the personal computer industry, radical innovation and high 
market share instability occurred after the peak in entry rates.   
 
The paper also showed that measures of financial volatility tend to be correlated 
with the outcomes of creative destruction. Since market valuation is to a large extent a 
process of valuing firms against each other in the competitive battle, it is not surprising 
that market share instability is correlated with both the “excess volatility” of stock prices 
and “idiosyncratic risk”.    
 
The paper also showed that this correlation is hard to capture when aggregate 
financial data is used (i.e. average industry stock prices and dividends).  To capture the 
effect of creative destruction on financial volatility it is necessary to look at firm level data 
since average industry data smoothes out the very uneven process (between firms) at the 
center of our investigation.  
 
Finally, we have suggested the possibility of a relationship between these indices of 
creative destruction and economy wide growth. We have suggested that what matters for 
economic growth is not (only) firm and industry growth, but uneven growth, which allows 
some firms to survive and some to fail.  This uneven growth is the result of radical 
technological change and productivity increases which, as described above, (often) 
undermine the leads of the incumbents (Tushman and Anderson 1986).   
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TABLE 1 
Standard Deviation (and Mean in Italics) of Market Share Instability, Units and Stock 
prices 
 
MS Inst.    Units    Stock Stck/SP500
AUTO
1908-1918 25.2 0.1620 na na
0.0401 na na
1918-1928 22.6 0.1569 0.1458 0.1257
0.0304 0.0939 0.0617
1918-1941 17.9 0.1500 0.1393 0.1089
0.0378 0.0620 0.0352
1948-2000 7.6 0.0638 0.0791 0.0352
0.0070 0.0298 -0.0020
1948-1970 10.3 0.0759 0.0671 0.0372
0.0171 0.0335 0.0002
1970-2000 5.6 0.0523 0.0881 0.0335
-0.0030 0.0243 -0.0036
PC
1970-1980 1.4 0.2062 0.0708 0.0294
0.2431 -0.0047 -0.0039
1980-1990 11.5 0.1884 0.0662 0.0324
0.1450 0.0154 -0.0136
1990-2000 17.9 0.0357 0.1196 0.0445
0.0646 0.0585 -0.0003
1970-2000 28.9 0.1758 0.0905 0.0349
0.1504 0.0258 -0.0038
top = standard deviation, bottom italics=mean value
bold number=decade with highest value
MS Inst.= instability index from Eq. (1)
Units=units produced
Stock=industry-level stock price
Stck/SP500= industry-level stock price divided by S&P500 stock price 
na= not available since auto industry first publicly quoted in 1918  
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Table 2 
Industry level stock returns: descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. Industry  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
TRANSPORT 0.1007 3.4089 -0.2685 0.3831 FOREST PROD. PUBL. 0.0690 0.3300 -0.2166 0.1074
SEMICONDUCTORS 0.0768 1.6463 -0.6776 0.2619 HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 0.0529 0.2607 -0.1699 0.1064
NAT. GAS PIPELINES 0.0798 0.9588 -0.3777 0.1502 INSURANCE MULTIL. 0.0669 0.2992 -0.2170 0.1053
BUILD. MATERIALS 0.0674 0.4662 -0.2613 0.1367 FINANCIAL 0.0705 0.3073 -0.2450 0.1041
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 0.0480 0.5427 -0.2612 0.1367 FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 0.0724 0.3119 -0.1619 0.1014
AUTOMOBILES 0.0782 0.4403 -0.2328 0.1331 INSURANCE PROPERTY 0.0752 0.2985 -0.1443 0.1012
TRUCKER TRANSP. 0.0416 0.3759 -0.2406 0.1275 FOREST PROD. PAPER 0.0599 0.3327 -0.1864 0.1001
BANKS NY 0.0816 0.3975 -0.2884 0.1251 CHEMICALS AND COAL 0.0684 0.3070 -0.1955 0.0992
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 0.0666 0.4930 -0.3635 0.1250 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 0.0678 0.3539 -0.2083 0.0950
AEROSP. DEFENCE 0.0736 0.5037 -0.3964 0.1246 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 0.0676 0.2514 -0.2093 0.0946
PAPER CONFECT 0.0646 0.4118 -0.2364 0.1210 BREWERS AND ALCOOL 0.0573 0.2766 -0.1325 0.0940
ENTERTAINMENT 0.0584 0.3630 -0.2835 0.1196 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 0.0758 0.2685 -0.1836 0.0926
ALLUMINIUM 0.0593 0.4188 -0.2328 0.1193 ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 0.0643 0.2536 -0.2529 0.0870
TOBACCO 0.0930 0.3754 -0.2496 0.1177 COMPOSIT OIL 0.0790 0.2893 -0.1575 0.0800
RETAIL COMP. 0.0523 0.2879 -0.3449 0.1145 ELECTRIC POWER COMP. 0.0992 0.3333 -0.0794 0.0740
PUBLISHING NEWSP. 0.0629 0.4078 -0.2308 0.1128 SP500 0.0657 0.2390 -0.2049 0.0713
RESTAURANTS 0.0525 0.2843 -0.2503 0.1081 PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.0930 0.2724 -0.0650 0.0684
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Table 3 
Panel estimation of the relationship between volatility and R&D intensity in 34 firms 
from 5 industries (biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, computers, agriculture, textiles) 
Method Dim. corr. int coeff t-stat dim coeff t-stat r&d coeff (-5) t-stat Rbar sq
Pooled OLS n 0.106 23.586 - - 0.056 5.098 0.055
GLS n 0.086 34.856 - - 0.048 3.032 0.143
FE Pooled OLS n CS spec - - - 0.023 2.354 0.399
FE GLS n CS spec - - - 0.017 0.907 0.395
Pooled OLS y 0.116 22.672 -0.061 -3.897 0.056 5.264 0.085
GLS y 0.091 29.611 -0.015 -2.187 0.049 3.130 0.167
FE Pooled OLS y CS spec - -0.090 -1.007 0.023 2.351 0.399
FE GLS y CS spec - -0.065 -1.659 0.018 0.957 0.401
Pooled OLS y CS spec 0.205 19.351 CS spec - 0.038 3.689 0.311
GLS y CS spec 0.124 16.181 CS spec - 0.037 2.207 0.291
 
Note: CS spec = Cross Section specific  
 
Table 4 
Growth: Industry (Autos and PCs) vs. Aggregate Economy  
AUTO ECONOMY 
QUAL. CH. MS INS OUTPUT MFP MFP GDP
1895-1908 0.2500 0.2000 0.1356    na    na 0.0431
1909-1922 0.0310 0.1800 0.0304    na    na 0.0312
1923-1929 0.0320 0.1600 0.0378    na    na 0.0455
PC ECONOMY
QUAL. CH MS INS OUTPUT MFP MFP GDP
1975-1986 0.3400 0.0340 0.2431 0.2142 0.0892 0.0313
1987-1992 0.1700 0.1150 0.0357 0.2800 0.0500 0.0257
1993-2000 0.3800 0.2010 0.0217 0.6388 0.1050 0.0373
        notes: QUAL. CH. = quality change index, hedonic prices/actual BEA prices, (Filson 2002)
MS INS= market share instability index, (Hymer and Pashigian 1962)
OUTPUT=average growth of industry output (number of cars and PCs)
MFP=average growth rate of multi-factor productivity 
GDP= average growth rate of GDP  
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
Movement of 28 Leading Auto Producers Ranked According to Places in Production 
(source: Harvard Business Review, Epstein, 1928) 
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Figure 5 
Figure 6 
Standard Deviation of Actual Stock Price and EMM Price in the Auto Industry
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 Appendix:  Data Sources 
 
Automobiles: Individual firm units and total industry units from 1904-1999 were collected 
from annual editions of Wards Automotive Yearbooks (first editions, reporting data 
starting in 1904, are published in 1924).  Firm-specific stock prices, dividends, and 
earnings/share figures were collected from annual editions of Moody’s Industrial Manual.  
Industry-specific per share data was collected from the Standard and Poor’s Analyst 
Handbook11 (the firms included to calculate that index are listed in endnote 11).  Hedonic 
prices and data on changes in quality are from the series used in Raff and Trajtenberg 
(1997). 
 
Personal Computers:   Annual firm-level data on the total number of personal computers 
produced from 1973-2000 was obtained from the International Data Corporation (IDC), a 
market research firm in Framingham, Massachusetts.  Firm-level stock price, dividend, 
and earnings per share data were obtained from Compustat. Industry-level financial 
variables were obtained, as for the post-war auto industry, from the Standard and Poor’s 
Analyst’s Handbook (2000).  The firms which define this index (listed in endnote 12 are 
all included in the firm-level analysis, except for Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems 
(the only two firms in the S&P computer index which don’t produce personal 
computers)12.  Hedonic prices and data on changes in quality are from the series used in 
Berndt and Rappaport (2000) and Filson (2001).   
 
Economy:  GDP data and industry and aggregate MFP data was obtained from the BLS 
(http://www.bea.gov/).   
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The firms used to create the S&P index for automobiles are (dates in parentheses are the beginning and 
end dates): Chrysler (12-18-25), Ford Motor (8-29-56), General Motors  (1-2-18), American Motors (5-5-54 
to 8-5-87), Auburn Automobile (12-31-25 to 5-4-38), Chandler-Cleveland (1-2-18 to 12-28-25), Hudson 
Motor Car (12-31-25 to  4-28-54), Hupp Motor Car (1-2-18 to 1-17-40), Nash-Kelvinator Corp (12-31-25 to  
4-28-54), Packard Motor Car (1-7-20 to 9-29-54), Pierce-Arrow (1-2-18 to 12-28-25), Reo Motor Car (12-31-
25 to 1-17-40), Studebaker Corp. (10-6-54 to 4-22-64), White Motor (1-2-18 to 11-2-32), and Willy’s 
Overland (1-2-18 to 3-29-33). 
 
12 The computer industry was first labeled by S&P as Computer Systems and then in 1996 changed to 
Computer Hardware. Firms included in this index are:  
Apple Computer (4-11-84), COMPAQ Computer (2-4-88), Dell Computer (9-5-96), Gateway, Inc. (4-24-98), 
Hewlett-Packard (6-4-95), IBM (1-12-19), Silicon Graphics (1-17-95), and Sun Microsystems (8-19-92).  
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